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Introduction
When Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) criticized Western nationalism in the 
early twentieth century, a main reference for his argumentation was an Eastern 
country, Japan.  By examining Tagore’s comments on Japanese culture and politics 
against the genre of Nihonjinron 日本人論 (theory of Japaneseness),1) this paper ex-
plores Japan’s ambiguous image in the modern world.  To this end, it is necessary to 
compare the views of Japan and its subtle relationship with the idea of Asia held by 
other contemporary luminaries, such as John Dewey (1859–1952) and Bertrand Rus-
sell (1872–1970).
Nihonjinron is not an inclusive term.  It refers to a speciﬁc genre that aims to por-
tray the “Japanese character” and stress its uniqueness.  Tagore never had any inten-
tion to develop this genre.  However, the style of his expression is reminiscent of the 
Nihonjinron prevalent at the time, and as such, demands inquiry into their similarities 
and differences, as well as the circumstances that prompted the genre to thrive.
Historically speaking, Tagore’s Nihonjinron was a conscious echo of the ideal of 
“Asia is one” proposed by Okakura Kakuzo¯ 岡倉覚三 (1863–1913).2)  In The Ideal of 
the East, a book that drew inspiration from the author’s sojourn in India in 1902 and 
was published in 1903, Okakura gives Asian history a shape by narrating how the 
thought and artistic styles of India and China had developed, and how they had 
been fused together and raised to a new height in Japan.  With the passage of time, 
Okakura’s original ideal–nostalgic as well as nationalistic–had strayed into impe-
rialist pan-Asianism when Tagore visited Japan in 1916.  The Indian poet was aware 
of the development and tried to caution his Japanese audiences against it.  Therefore, 
although Tagore hailed Japan’s signiﬁcant role in the expected rise of Asia, his 
speeches were no less warnings against Japanese militarization.3)  To illuminate 
Tagore’s particular formulation of Nihonjinron, with its deliberate linkage to the ideal 
of Asia, Dewey’s and Russell’s remarks will be drawn in comparison.
Tagore, Dewey, and Russell all visited Japan and China within a few years around 
the end of WWI.  It was a period when Japan was rising rapidly to an international 
power but still many years away from its full-scale invasion of China.  Intellectual 
activities were thriving in both countries, with foreign ideas imported and foreign 
thinkers invited; among the visitors were Tagore, Dewey, and Russell.  Besides ex-
pounding their philosophical thought, they travelled around and formulated their 
civilizational observations as well.  Critically, Japan’s ambiguous position in the 
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East-West dichotomy ﬁnds very different interpretations in the three luminaries’ 
portraits of world civilizations.  The differences, as I will argue, reﬂect how the idea 
of Asia was characterized in the early twentieth century from different political 
stances.
1.  Intellectual basis of Nihonjinron and Tagore’s view of Japan
To better understand Tagore’s view of Japan in the context of early-twentieth- 
century world politics, a review of the intellectual foundation of Nihonjinron and 
Tagore’s semi-missionary overseas tours is necessary.  
In An Introduction to Japanese Society, Sugimoto Yoshio describes Nihonjinron as “a 
discourse that … has persisted as the long-lasting paradigm that regards Japan as a 
uniquely homogeneous society.”4)  Dependence on superiors, group orientation, and 
“consensus society” are among the features that are said to underlie Japan’s homoge-
neity.5)  Nihonjinron presumes “that all  Japanese share the attribute in question,” and 
regards it as existing only marginally in other societies.  Furthermore, there “is an 
ahistorical assumption that the trait has prevailed in Japan for an unspeciﬁed period 
of time, independently of historical circumstances.”6)  In a monograph of Nihonjinron 
studies, Harumi Befu also characterizes this genre as “hegemony of homogeneity” 
and explains that “Nihonjinron writings share a singular objective: to demonstrate 
unique qualities of Japanese culture, Japanese society, and the Japanese people … As 
such, little or no attention is given in writings of this genre to internal variation.”7)
As a sociologist, Sugimoto adopts statistical methods to demythologize the Nihon-
jinron paradigm without examining it in historical terms.  Befu’s anthropologic stud-
ies mainly focus on the reproduction of this literature in the post-war period.  In this 
regard, Minami Hiroshi’s 南博 (1914–2001) Nihonjinron: From the Meiji Era to the Pres-
ent critically reviews the development of the genre over a much longer time span. 
Minami declared: “This book attempts to trace objectively the development of Ni-
honjinron from the Meiji Restoration until the present day [i.e. the passing away of 
the Showa Emperor in 1989].  It can be said that the outcome is equivalent to a mod-
ern history of self-consciousness possessed by the Japanese.”8)  After examining hun-
dreds of representative works, Minami concluded: 
Nihonjinron rose to prominence concomitant to great social transformations 
from the Meiji era … With the intent to catch up with and surpass advanced 
countries, there emerged a self-understanding and self-reﬂection on the part of 
the Japanese people based on comparisons with Western countries.9)
Miyake Setsurei’s 三宅雪嶺 (1860–1945) remarks exemplify this statement.  Ad-
dressing a Meiji Japan that was confronted with increasing Western challenges, he 
published both The True, Good, and Beautiful Japanese and The False, Bad, Ugly Japanese 
in 1891.  The two books emphasize contrasting characteristics of the Japanese people, 
but their purposes converge.  As a nationalistic traditionalist, Miyake expected the 
Japanese sense of the true, the good, and the beautiful to contribute to a more 
harmonious world, while reminding the Japanese people of their less favorable 
aspects that might prevent that expectation from being fulﬁlled.  He concluded that 
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“Even if we tried our best to imitate, our country would become nothing more than 
an inferior Western country, and our people an inferior Western people.  The result 
would be a mere increase in inferior Western races.  Ah!  Is this what Nature, which 
fosters both heaven and earth, really intends?”10)  In a 1907 work, Haga Yaichi 芳賀
矢一 (1867–1927) also enumerated ten virtues of the Japanese people–loyalty to the 
emperor and the nation, respect for ancestors and family reputation, realism, love of 
nature, optimism, candidness, subtlety, neatness, courtesy and etiquette, and being 
kind and forgiving–and hoped for their preservation in the process of Japan’s inter-
action with other cultures.11)
Nihonjinron became a major genre during the Meiji era, but this period is not to be 
mistaken for its inception.  Indeed, one of the earliest authors of Nihonjinron men-
tioned by Minami is the Edo period scholar Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 (1730–
1801), who, by contrasting the Japanese temperament with the Chinese, claimed a 
uniquely aesthetic psychology of the Japanese.12)  However far back its historical 
roots may lie, it can be observed that Nihonjinron is a discourse that differentiates Ja-
pan from others, whether China or the West, while assuming little self-differentiation 
within Japan.  Admittedly, the idea of Japanese homogeneity has greater historical 
nuances and not every scholar agrees on the established view of Nihonjinron.13)  Nev-
ertheless, concerning the ideological ground of this genre, the delineation above is 
sufﬁcient to introduce us to the world that Tagore addressed.
Rabindranath Tagore received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913.  Born to an 
aristocratic family in Calcutta (known as Kolkata from 2001), the cultural capital of 
British India, Tagore was well educated in both Indian classics and modern Western 
disciplines from an early age.  Keen awareness of the conﬂict between Eastern and 
Western civilizations was deeply rooted in his mind.  Given the circumstances, the 
Nobel Prize gave him worldwide fame and allowed him unprecedented opportuni-
ties to travel around the world and exchange ideas with contemporary intellectuals.
Tagore’s ﬁrst overseas tour after becoming the Nobel laureate took place in 1916. 
The United States was his destination but he stayed in Japan for three months en 
route.14)  Of the three public lectures Tagore gave there, the last two later became 
part of his famous Nationalism.  Besides, in another series of lectures published in 
1922, Tagore in his articulation of “East and West” refers to Japan as accommodat-
ing the traditional and modern worlds simultaneously, with the latter gradually 
gaining the upper hand.15)  Hence, it can be said that Japan played a crucial role in 
shaping Tagore’s civilizational discourse.
It is not without precedent to characterize Tagore’s depiction of Japan as Nihonjin-
ron.  It has been suggested that his Japan Travelogue “can be counted as one of the early 
examples of Nihonjinron authored by foreign intellectuals.”16)  While Japan Travelogue 
consists of private letters, it does not differ from Tagore’s public lectures in its at-
tempt to discover the uniqueness of Japan and to weave it into his overarching 
discourse whenever appropriate.  In fact, Tagore could hardly claim any genuine 
knowledge of Japan; as Stephen Hay points out, Tagore mainly described Japan in 
preconceived terms that ﬁt his East-West framework.17)  Nonetheless, deeper explo-
ration indicates that what obliged Tagore to forge his discourse was the same trend 
that fueled the proliferation of Nihonjinron , albeit the intentions to foreground 
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Japan’s uniqueness differed.  In view of Japan’s successful modernization, Tagore 
charged the country with the dual responsibility of moderating the materialistic 
aspect of the West and endowing the East with a reinvigorated spirit.  On the other 
hand, the East-West dialectics was also visible in both Miyake’s and Haga’s Nihonjinron 
cited above, but it was addressed more in terms of the tension between the national-
istic and the universalistic.  Historically, this tension persisted through the 1910s and 
the 1920s, and the nationalistic bent emerged into fascist Nihonjinron later.18)  For 
example, in 1930 O¯kawa Shu¯mei 大川周明 (1886–1957) appealed to his audiences 
that “what I would like to see is the revival of an upright and strong Japan, which 
will defeat the evil [i.e. Western inﬂuences] that dominates the world.”19)
2.  Tagore’s “Nationalism in Japan” and beyond
When Tagore paid his ﬁrst visit to Japan in 1916, Japan had already become the 
strongest non-Western country in terms of economic and military prowess.  Ad-
dressing an audience of inﬂating self-conﬁdence, Tagore’s message was clear and he 
organized his three public lectures into a coherent argument.
The ﬁrst public speech, delivered in Osaka on June 1, was introductory but only 
partly complimentary.  Tagore said he had been dreaming of visiting Japan, “where 
the East and the West found their meeting place and carried on their courtship far 
enough to give assurance of a wedding.”20)  This voyage reminded him of the adven-
tures of ancient Buddhist monks who brought the truths of life from India, through 
China, to Japan.  While those scriptures were transmitted with great difﬁculty, they 
retained their simplicity in full wisdom and love.  In contrast, modern technology, 
which shortened both spatial and temporal distance, simply multiplied things with-
out facilitating access to their cores.  Tagore complained that what greeted his eyes 
when his ship was docking in Kobe was not different from what he had seen in major 
Western cities.  “But this is not Japan,”21) thus claimed the poet with his determina-
tion to discover the uniqueness of the country.
The second lecture, “The Message of India to Japan,” was given at Tokyo Imperial 
University on June 11.  Tagore started with words of gratitude to Japan for rejuvenat-
ing Asia.  He then adapted this rejuvenation to an overarching framework, in which 
both Eastern and Western civilizations have lifecycles.  After contributing to 
humanistic ideals, Eastern civilizations became inactive and bound in tradition.  In 
this sense, Japan’s phenomenal rise since the late nineteenth century was expected 
to herald the awakening of the East into its next cycle of vigor.  Tagore praised mod-
ern Japan as coming “out of the immemorial East like a lotus blossoming in an easy 
grace … [it] has also fearlessly claimed all the gifts of the modern age for herself.”22) 
Nonetheless, he argued, “I, for myself, cannot believe that Japan has become what 
she is by imitating the West … The real truth is that science is not man’s nature, it is 
mere knowledge and training.”23)  Here Tagore attributed Japan’s modern achieve-
ments to a spiritual source traceable to a time immemorial.  He not only defended 
Japan’s uniqueness against accusations of its imitation of the West, but extrapolated 
to the East in general this capability for self-transformation.  Since Japan assumed 
the leading role in this round of awakening, Tagore claimed: “Therefore your re-
sponsibility is all the greater, for in your voice Asia shall answer the questions that 
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Europe has submitted to the conference of Man.”24)
The last public lecture, “The Spirit of Japan,” was delivered at Keio University in 
Tokyo on July 2.  Tagore was effusive in his commendations: “I have travelled in 
many countries and have met with men of all classes, but never in my travels did I 
feel the presence of the human so distinctly as in this land.”25)  What follows is an 
observation that captures the outer features–if not the “spirit”–of Japan:
You see a people, whose heart has come out and scattered itself in profusion in 
its commonest utensils of everyday life, in its social institutions, in its manners, 
that are carefully perfect, and in its dealings with things that are not only deft, 
but graceful in every movement.26)
Tagore went further to assert that:
This opening of the heart to the soul of the world is not conﬁned to a section of 
your privileged classes … but it belongs to all your men and women of all con-
ditions.27)
Moreover, he also depicted Japan as a “civilisation of human relationship[s],” and 
the nation became “one family with your Emperor as its head.”28)  Not only did 
Tagore stress the uniqueness of Japan, but all assumptions underlying Nihonjinron 
feature prominently here.  A turning point came, however, immediately after Tago-
re’s praise: “And this had made me all the more apprehensive of the change … For 
the huge heterogeneity of the modern age, whose only common bond is usefulness, 
is nowhere so pitifully exposed against the dignity and hidden power of reticent 
beauty, as in Japan.”29)
As mentioned above, the two Tokyo lectures constitute (with slight abridgement) 
“Nationalism in Japan,” one of the chapters of Nationalism that was published in 
1917.  It is thus reasonable to ask what “nationalism” meant for Tagore, and why it 
would do so much harm to the Japanese sensibility of beauty.  An explanation can 
be culled from these lectures:
The genius of Europe has given her people the power of organisation, which 
has specially made itself manifest in politics and commerce and in coordinat-
ing scientiﬁc knowledge.30)
Europe has a great tradition of humanity as Tagore acknowledged, but its inclina-
tion for organization with the help of modern scientiﬁc knowledge had made it 
narrowly focused on efﬁciency and proﬁt-making, which resulted in nationalism and 
materialism.31)  Furthermore, “[t]he political civilisation … is based upon exclusive-
ness … It is always afraid of other races achieving their eminence, naming it as a 
peril.”32)  As Tagore understood, Japan had tried hard to prove itself as aggressive as 
Western nations to win their respect, but it also fell prey to their exclusiveness.  The 
“Immigration Act of 1924” in the United States was a good example, towards which 
Tagore was to share indignation with the Japanese.
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It is noted that the third speech was much more critical than the second because 
Tagore had spent some time experiencing Japan.33)  Nevertheless, as the two lectures 
were too close for extensive exploration of Japan in between, and there is an argu-
mentative logic tying them together, perhaps it can be said that Tagore was more 
preoccupied with drawing Japan into his framework than with understanding 
Japan’s history and culture for their own sake.
Critically, Tagore did not show much historical knowledge in his grand narrative. 
Neither the socio-political conditions of the emergence of nationalism in the West 
nor its impact on Japan receives satisfactory explication.  Nonetheless, Tagore’s cri-
tique of nationalism changes the discourse from the categories of historical, social, 
and political studies into civilizational discourse, which Uma Das Gupta designates 
as “a cultural nationalism.”34)  Although Tagore was no less a strong supporter of na-
tional independence, his Nationalism is essentially an anti-nationalist discourse that 
aims to upset the paradigm of Western modernity and crown the East with supreme 
humanity.  For Tagore, only with such a spiritual tradition could Japan, a newly 
modernized Eastern country, lead the world into an era of cultural fusion.
To conclude Tagore’s view of nationalism, one must consider the overall structure 
of the book, as well as what is missing from it.  The volume deals with nationalism 
in the West, in Japan, and in India, respectively.  Tagore showed unusual perception 
in pointing out the problems and opportunities that were facing India and America, 
but the chapter on Japan is the most theoretically complicated because of the pivotal 
position Japan occupied in the East-West dichotomy.  However, while Tagore said in 
Tokyo that “[t]he whole world waits to see what this great Eastern nation is going to 
do with the opportunities and responsibilities she has accepted from the hands of 
the modern time,”35) he was not optimistic.  Before sailing for Japan, Tagore ex-
pressed his concerns in a letter: “Japan is the youngest disciple of Europe–she has 
no soul–she is all science–and she has no sentiment to spare for other people than 
her own.”36)  The three-month stay in Japan modiﬁed Tagore’s view, but his suspi-
cion persisted.
There is subtle evidence for this suspicion.  In 1905, Tagore so rejoiced at the vic-
tory of Japan over Russia that he personally organized a parade in Calcutta, but he 
mentioned nothing about this victory in his 1916 lectures, probably to avoid instigat-
ing Japanese imperialist pride.  Years later, Tagore revealed his disappointment at 
Japan in China in 1924, saying that “the East should not be humble when it had 
come into sudden good fortune.”37)  Here Japan claimed no more the great tradition 
of the East, but became a Westernized parvenu, whose expansionism in the inter-
war period threatened not only China but also India.
Indeed, Tagore valued China over Japan in terms of cultural ties with India. 
When in China, he mentioned frequently the millenia-long cultural interaction be-
tween China and India, and alluded to the disadvantages shared by the two coun-
tries at the time to arouse sympathy from his audience.  Nevertheless, despite this 
strong afﬁnity, China could hardly contribute to Tagore’s grand narrative about an 
Asia that he hoped could modify Western modernity.  He mentioned no historical 
inﬂuences of China on Japan in his Tokyo lectures, taking “Japaneseness” as natu-
rally coming from an abstract East, which, through the example of Japan, proved it-
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self capable of catching up with the modern West.  Therefore, in Tagore’s discourse, 
“Asia” was more theoretical than real, with tradition versus modernity being the core 
issue, the greatest barrier to a desired cultural unity being West-originated national-
ism.
3.  China, Japan, and Asia in the eyes of Western luminaries
In an essay commemorating Tagore’s centenary in 1961, Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内
好 (1910–1977) states that “in Japan, generally speaking, Tagore was regarded as a 
poet from a ruined country; in China, he roused sympathy as a resistant poet by 
singing songs of national independence.” While this judgment is simplistic, Takeuchi 
was perceptive in pointing out that “if we do not take Tagore’s relationship with Chi-
na into consideration, we cannot fully understand his relationship with Japan.”38) 
Furthermore, he also noted that other foreign ﬁgures such as Dewey and Russell 
must be involved in the comparison.39)
However, as will be demonstrated, this comparison renders the idea of Asia prob-
lematic.  While they all considered China an Asian country, it is a totally different 
issue when Japan was taken into consideration.  The fortunes of Japan and China in 
the modern world were so different, one might wonder if the geographical designa-
tion of Asia was appropriate for accommodating such contrasting historical experi-
ences.  Given the immensity of Asia, Tagore consciously divided it into eastern and 
western parts,40) and claimed that in the past “the whole of eastern Asia from Burma 
to Japan was united with India in the closest tie of friendship.”41)  What Tagore was 
referring to was the inﬂuence of Buddhism.  This cultural bond, despite its historici-
ty, does not seem to have dovetailed with the realpolitik of the time, as observed by 
Dewey and Russell.
John Dewey stayed in China from May 1919 to July 1921.  During this period and 
slightly afterwards, he wrote several essays and published them as China, Japan, and 
the U.S.A. at the end of 1921.  The booklet aims to illustrate the complicated interna-
tional relationships at the time.  As Dewey headed for China by way of Japan, he 
made a comparison between the two countries:
It is three days’ easy journey from Japan to China.  It is doubtful whether any-
where in the world another journey of the same length brings with it such a 
complete change of political temper and belief … The difference … concerns 
the ideas, beliefs and alleged information current about one and the same fact: 
the status of Japan in the international world and especially its attitude toward 
China.42)
Dewey observed that the talkative and straightforward Chinese were unanimous 
in “the feeling of … the domination of Chinese politics and industry by Japan with a 
view to its ﬁnal absorption.”43)  To the contrary, in Japan, “the land of reserves and 
reticences,” Dewey found “a subtle nervous tension in the atmosphere as of a coun-
try on the verge of change but not knowing where the change will take it.”44)  Tagore 
sensed a similar uncertainty in 1916 and interpreted it as a tension between tradi-
tional Asian ideals and modern European utility.  Dewey focused instead on the 
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economic and political problems that were facing Japan, both domestically and 
internationally.  Afterwards Dewey contrasted the Japanese and German treatments 
of Shandong Province.  While Germany took possession only of the port city of 
Qingdao and let the Chinese people lead their daily lives unhindered, Japan not 
only took over Germany’s previous rights but also monopolized Shandong’s economy 
and militarized virtually the entire province.45)  Here he touched upon the issue of 
the Twenty-One Demands upon China in 1915, by which Japan attempted to 
subsume the northern part of China under its control.  Such ambitions produced an 
unexpected result, however.
But Asia has come to consciousness, and … it will force itself upon the reluctant 
consciousness of the west, and lie heavily upon its conscience.  And for this 
fact, China and the western world are indebted to Japan.46)
Then, what did Asia signify for Dewey?
For continental Asia is, for practical purposes, India and China, representing 
two of the oldest civilizations of the globe … Asia is really here after all … And 
in the future, so to speak, it is going to be even more here, with its awakened 
national consciousness of about half the population of the whole globe.47)
For Dewey, “continental Asia” seems to entail a set of long-standing conditions of 
civilization totally different from those of the modern West, thus excluding Japan for 
reasons that were more complicated than simply geographical or political.  In the 
early twentieth century, Japan constituted a European-like power that sought to 
maximize proﬁts in continental Asia.  Under the circumstances, from Dewey’s point 
of view, the only force to preserve the integrity of Asia–territorially and economi-
cally–was America.  He directed many of his arguments to a single prospect: the 
important role that America was to assume at the Washington Conference.  Not 
only must the “open door policy” to China be insisted upon, but “the door [should] 
be opened to light, to knowledge and understanding.” What really mattered was 
“the need of China and the Orient in general for freer and fuller communications 
with the rest of the world.” Dewey ended his book with the following caution: “To 
shirk this responsibility on the alleged ground that economic imperialism and orga-
nized greed will surely bring the Conference to failure is supine and snobbish.”48)
Clearly, Dewey’s concern about China was no less intense than that of Tagore. 
They criticized Western civilization in similar language such as “economic imperial-
ism” and “organized greed,” and they were both waiting for the revival of Asia. 
Nonetheless, we observe in Tagore, as an Asian, a desire to see Asia stand on its own 
feet, which accounts for the signiﬁcance he attached to Japan.  Dewey, by contrast, 
wanted to see Asia rise under the auspices of America.
Now let’s turn to Bertrand Russell for a European perspective of Asia in the inter-
war period.  He arrived in China in October 1920 and left the country in July 1921. 
He made a brief visit to Japan on the way back to England and published The Prob-
lems of China in 1922.  Russell understood that the problems of China were 
39
signiﬁcant on account of their vast scale: “all the world will be vitally affected by the 
development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive factor, for good or 
evil, during the next two centuries.”49)
On a deeper level, however, it seems that Russell expected China to provide an 
alternative civilizational paradigm to the modern West, against parts of which he 
nursed strong resentment.  He valued China highly for the pervasiveness of its folk 
art, intuitive happiness, and human relations.  These qualities, claimed Russell, had 
long disappeared in the modern West, which mostly gained its property “by wide-
spread oppression and exploitation.”50)  Indeed, China had its own cultural predica-
ments, and Russell had witnessed there the struggle between pro-Westernization 
forces and the traditionalists.  But he believed that China would be more capable of 
achieving an organic growth from its own tradition while assimilating what was 
good from the West if time permitted, an expectation that Tagore placed on Japan.
Interestingly, Russell’s perception of Japan is also tinged with Nihonjinron.  How-
ever, unlike Tagore, this uniqueness of Japan was for Russell a source of misgivings, 
and did not have inherent potential to mitigate its borrowed vices:
Japan is an extraordinarily interesting country.  The synthesis of East and West 
… is of a most peculiar kind.  There is far more of the East than appears on the 
surface; but there is everything of the West that tends to national efﬁciency.51)
This particularity, as Russell noted, derived from Japan’s rather confused self-
identity within a larger context of Asia:
Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a unity; but from this unity Japan 
must be excluded.  Russia, China, and India … could be self-subsistent eco-
nomically … Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for power 
and prosperity.  As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal mentality appro-
priate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon Asiatic conquest and 
military prowess.52)
For both Dewey and Russell, Asia was basically “continental Asia,” whose pillars 
were China and India.  Whether Russia was included or not, Japan did not seem 
compatible with this unity.  Russell pointed out that the vast plains of China, India, 
and Russia could afford them independence of commerce and indifference to prog-
ress.  Japan, notwithstanding its geographical proximity, was characterized by two 
incompatible ambitions: “On the one hand, they wish to pose as the champions of 
Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the other hand, they wish to be ad-
mitted to equality by the white Powers.”53)  Although Tagore was conscious of the 
dilemma, he could not afford this division between continental Asia and Japan, at 
least at the beginning of his international career, because it would undermine his 
ideal of an Asia that was very much in need of modern transformation that Japan 
had achieved.
Both Dewey and Russell visited China and Japan during the inter-war period. 
They both showed admiration for Chinese tradition and repugnance toward the ag-
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gression of modern Japan.54)  They were also both in a position to predict the future 
of the Far East after WWI.  Their views differ on the Washington Conference. 
While Dewey expected America to take a moral stance, Russell, whose book was 
written after the conference, regarded America as a mere great power that support-
ed China on the Shandong problem out of political considerations.  Nevertheless, 
when it came to Asia, what ﬁgured in their minds was China in terms of its funda-
mental difference with the West.  On the contrary, “modern Japan must count as a 
Western product.”55)
Conclusion
This paper contextualizes Tagore’s view of Japan into the discursive space of Ni-
honjinron.  Through his comments, Tagore was actually addressing the unbalanced 
power structure of the modern world.  Although Tagore did not claim any authority 
on the issue of Japan, he involved himself in modern Japanese intellectual history by 
participating in the country’s efforts of deﬁning “Japaneseness.”  Minami Hiroshi 
claimed, “[t]here are no other peoples comparable to the Japanese in terms of the 
fondness for deﬁning their national character.”56)  Such an inclination is not a mod-
ern product as Edwin Reischauer (1910–1990) attested:
Early in their history the Japanese developed the habit of cataloguing foreign 
inﬂuences and contrasting them with “native” characteristics.  One result has 
been a frequent emphasis in Japanese history on primitive and therefore sup-
posedly native Japanese traits.57)
Despite the early roots of this tendency of deﬁning the “national character,” the 
modern period witnessed the proliferation of Nihonjinron with Japan’s growing ne-
cessity for self-deﬁnition in a ﬁercely competitive world.  What Tagore appealed to 
was a Japan seeking to secure its identity and proﬁts by growing imperialistic; both a 
uniﬁed Asia against the West and the idea of “surpassing modernity” were of great 
interest to lecturer and audience; only the purposes to stress the uniqueness and mis-
sion of Japan were opposite.  
As Takeuchi Yoshimi noted, one cannot separate Tagore’s Japanese experiences 
from his Chinese experiences.  The reason is simple: Japan and China stood for suc-
cessful modernization and great tradition respectively, and were indispensable to 
the revival of Asia along with Tagore’s native India.  However, even though Tagore 
showed stronger afﬁnity toward China, it was the tremendous achievements of mod-
ern Japan that received most articulation in his pan-Asian discourse.  In contrast, for 
Western intellectuals such as Dewey and Russell, the issue of a uniﬁed Asia did not 
weigh heavily and they were comfortable with an idea of Asia without Japan.  
Compared with Dewey and Russell, Tagore focused less on historical speciﬁcs 
and political conditions in Japan and China.  Being culturally oriented, he praised 
the Meiji Restoration as “the most wonderful revolution that the world has ever 
seen.”58)  Interestingly, to the 1911 revolution that overturned China’s two-millennia 
long imperial system, Tagore gave not even a passing mention, whether in Japan in 
1916 or in China in 1924.  Apparently, this was not ignorance but choice out of his 
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humanistic concern.  In China, he paid a visit to the former emperor Puyi 溥儀 
(1906–1967) in the Forbidden City and showed much appreciation for the architecture 
and gardening of traditional China, an action much criticized by progressive-minded 
Chinese intellectuals at the time.59)
In sharp contrast to Tagore’s sentimental culturalism, Russell, who was apparent-
ly more read than Tagore in Japanese and Chinese histories, had much to say about 
the neo-traditionalist and centralist nature of the Meiji Restoration.60)  Dewey also 
expressed his suspicion of Japan straightforwardly: “[ Japan] has modern military 
weapons, a newly developed commerce, and efﬁcient transportation; but she still has 
not changed her old concepts, her old morals, her old habits.  As a result of this 
failure, Japan is paying the price both of the old civilization and of the new, without 
being able to reap a full measure of proﬁt from either.”61)
Tagore’s cultural-mindedness is all the more conspicuous in comparison with Sun 
Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866–1925), the father of modern China.  Sun invited Tagore to 
Guangzhou during the latter’s 1924 trip.  Although the visit could not be scheduled 
into Tagore’s itinerary, it is reasonable to assume that Sun was well informed of the 
content of Tagore’s lectures in China.  Months later, Sun also gave a speech in Japan 
on “Great Asianism.” Like Tagore, he tried to address the issue in cultural terms:
What kind of problem is it for the “Great Asianism” we are speaking of?  In 
brief, it is a cultural problem, a problem of comparison and conﬂict between 
Eastern and Western cultures.62)
This “cultural problem” of “Great Asianism,” according to Sun, was to commit Ja-
pan and China to an Asian unity.  As to Europe, he emphasized that only military 
means were feasible to reclaim the rights of Asian countries.63)  As Dewey noted, 
Sun remained a revolutionist type of nationalist throughout.64)  Sun reminded his 
Japanese audiences of the victory over Russia in 1905 and remembered how the 
Westerners were shocked by Russia’s defeat.  The anxiety of the “yellow peril” had 
risen in Europe again as Tagore also observed.  The difference lies in that Tagore 
was too worried about the militarization of Japan to mention this victory and only 
proposed a self-defensive armed force.65)  The advice fell on deaf ears at the time. 
However, after World War II, Tagore’s cordial warnings have been remembered and 
frequently cited by many Japanese.
A ﬁnal note.  As suggested previously, Nihonjinron and pan-Asianism are two 
intertwined discourses from the early twentieth century.  Despite changes of histori-
cal contents, Sugimoto Yoshio critically points out that the propagation of “Asian 
values” today as “almost a pan-Asian version of Nihonjinron.”66)  Both discourses of 
Asianess and Japaneseness assume a Western other and are premised on considerable 
economic and political maturity.  Such an ideology already took root when Japan 
tried to assert its entitlement in the world a century ago.
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